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Meaning and Dialogue Coherence: A Proof-theoretic
Investigation
Paul Piwek
Centre for Research in Computing, The Open University, UK
Abstract. This paper presents a novel proof-theoretic account of dialogue coher-
ence. It focuses on an abstract class of cooperative information-oriented dialogues
and describes how their structure can be accounted for in terms of a multi-agent
hybrid inference system that combines natural deduction with information transfer
and observation. We show how certain dialogue structures arise out of the interplay
between the inferential roles of logical connectives (i.e., sentence semantics), a rule
for transferring information between agents, and a rule for information flow between
agents and their environment. The order of explanation is opposite in direction to
that adopted in game-theoretic semantics, where sentence semantics (or a notion of
valid inference) is derived from winning dialogue strategies. That approach and the
current one may, however, be reconcilable, since we focus on cooperative dialogue,
whereas the game-theoretic tradition concentrates on adversarial dialogue.
Keywords: Coherence, Dialogue Modelling, Natural Deduction, Multi-agent Infer-
ence, Proof-Theoretic Semantics
1. Introduction
Models of coherence come in many different shapes, from proposals
based on scripts, grammars, and social rule following to models of topic
continuity. A now slightly dated collection that provides an overview of
the multitude of approaches to dialogue coherence is Craig and Tracy
(1983). More recently, Mann (2002) surveys a number of extant analyses
of dialogue coherence.
The aim of this paper is to work out in detail a logic-based notion of
coherence for a particular abstract class of cooperative dialogues, rather
than to criticize or dismiss other approaches. In our view, coherence is
a complex phenomenon that is likely to require analyses from more
than one single perspective.
We provide an explication of dialogue coherence for the current class
of dialogues in terms of the meaning of the expressions that are used in
such dialogues against the background of the participants’ discursive
dispositions. Thus, coherence is modelled as a property of dialogues
whose meaning-bearing parts fit together in a certain way in context.
To construct an explication of dialogue coherence along these lines,
we adopt the following strategy. Firstly, we describe a theory of meaning
that provides the foundation for the current endeavour. This theory
c© 2007 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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complies with the Wittgensteinian slogan that “meaning is use”.1, 2
This pragmatist slogan is fleshed out by identifying the meaning of an
expression with its role in reasoning. This role is given by the circum-
stances of appropriate application of the expression and the appropriate
consequences of such an application. The meaning of logical vocabulary
will be assigned a privileged status in this undertaking and receive
a formalization in terms of a variant of Gentzen’s (1934) calculus of
Natural Deduction. Secondly, this standard Natural Deduction calculus
for solitary reasoners is extended to a calculus for multiple situated
reasoners. Thirdly, this extended Natural Deduction calculus is used
to model dialogue coherence. Whereas Gentzen’s calculus allows us to
characterize valid inferences, the extended calculus demarcates a cer-
tain type of coherent dialogue. We provide examples of dialogues that
are generated by the calculus and use these to bolster the initial plau-
sibility of the claim that coherence according to the extended calculus
mirrors certain features of coherence in natural language dialogue. This
is achieved by drawing attention to a number of structural properties
1 In particular, it conforms with the later Wittgenstein’s view that grasping
the meaning of a term involves mastering the language game in which that term
is used, analogous to mastering a calculus – e.g., being able to multiply: “Aber
dieses Versta¨ndnis, die Kenntniss der Sprache ist nicht ein Bewußtseinszustand,
der die Sa¨tze der Sprache begleitet. [...] Vielmehr ist es von der gleichen Art wie
das Verstehen, Beherschen eines Kalku¨ls also wie: multiplizieren ko¨nnen. [...] Was
der macht, der ein Zeichen in dem und dem Sinne deutet, versteht, is ein Schritt
eines Kalku¨ls (quasi einer Rechnung).” (Wittgenstein, 1984:47–51). Wittgenstein
contrasts his concept of meaning with the Augustinian approach where meaning
is equated with objects in the world, and also with the view that meaning can be
characterized in terms of the images that come to the mind of the language user.
2 The current paper (cf. section 2) presents a formal model of a certain aspect of
language use and might therefore not be considered truly Wittgensteinian in spirit.
The later Wittgenstein seems to have indeed been sceptical about the possibility of a
complete and rigorous theory of human language use. However, between the extreme
positions taken up by the early and the later Wittgenstein, there also appears to have
been a period – between 1929 and 1936 – where Wittgenstein occupied a position
that underpins the approach of the current paper. In that period, Wittgenstein
cooperated closely with Friedrich Waismann on a book, eventually published as
Waismann (1965), that would present a systematic account of his ideas. There, we
find a favourable account of Boltzman’s (1905) conception of a rigorous model as
“[not] making any claim that it conformed to something in the real world. It is
simply described and then whatever similarities exist between it and reality will
reveal themselves. This is no defect in the model. [...] What Boltzman accomplished
by this means was to keep his explanation undefiled. There is no temptation to
counterfeit reality, for the model is, so to speak, given once and for all, and it can be
seen how far it agrees with reality. And even if it does not, it still retains its value.”
(Waismann, 1965:77). For further discussion of the relation between language use
and rules in Wittgenstein’s thought see also Stenius (1967).
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of naturally occurring dialogues that are also found in dialogues that
are generated with the extended calculus.
2. Cooperative information-oriented dialogue
Walton and Krabbe (1995) point out that dialogue comes in many
varieties. Each variety has its own distinctive purpose and participant
aims and, as a result, concomitant notion of coherence. This makes
it impossible to study dialogue coherence regardless of dialogue type.
Consequently, in the current study, we restrict our attention to a spe-
cific class of dialogues which we call cooperative information-oriented
dialogues. The main purpose of this type of dialogue is the exchange of
information. Moreover, the participants’ aim (whether out of personal
interest or through external pressure) is to cooperate with each others’
requests for information. In such dialogues, participants are not inter-
ested in persuading each other of a certain point of view or negotiating
a particular course of action. The principal aim is simply the exchange
of information.
A relatively pure form of this type of dialogue is the information
desk dialogue, which has been a central topic of study in computational
linguistics and natural language processing, witness the large number
of projects on dialogue systems for providing travel information. Usu-
ally, in travel information dialogues, there is an enquirer who knows
the place of departure, destination, and approximate time of travel.
Given this information, the person at the information desk provides the
precise travel details. Most dialogues are, however, of a more hybrid
nature. Consider, for example, the following dialogue fragment from
Merritt (1976:333):
(1) 1. A: May I have a bottle of Mich?
2. B: Are you twenty one?
3. A: No
4. B: No
The turns in this dialogue all appear to contribute to information being
transferred between the interlocutors: the turns 1 and 2 introduce two
questions whereas 3 and 4 contain the answers. Turn 1 does, however,
also play another role: it signals to B that A would like B to sell A
a bottle of Mich. In other words, turn 1 also has an action-oriented
dimension: an (indirect) request is made. This dimension is beyond the
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scope of the current study; here the focus is strictly on the information-
oriented dimension.3
The dialogue in 1 neatly illustrates a number of phenomena which
are at the heart of coherent dialogue. Firstly, its utterances can be
viewed as being organized in pairs: question 1 and answer 4, and
question 2 and answer 3. Conversation analysts (Sudnow, 1972) have
observed that most dialogues are organized in this way: there is a first
part of a pair that sets up the expectation for a particular kind of
second part that is immediately relevant to the first part. The term
conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1972) has been introduced to describe
the relation between first and second parts. Such pairs often consist of
adjacent parts – in which case we speak of an adjacency pair (Schegloff
and Sacks, 1973). The following extract from a legal examination (from
the London–Lund Corpus 11.1:677–91; quoted from Stenstro¨m 1994)
shows a sequence of four such pairs:
(2) 1. A: Well Captain and Mrs Kay live in a flat on their own?
2. B: Yes
3. A: And they didn’t come down until after tea, did they?
4. B: No
5. A: Some time between tea and church?
6. B: Yes
7. A: So, there’s only Elsie and your wife?
8. B: Yes
In dialogue 2, all pairs are adjacency pairs. We have already seen that
the parts of a pair do not need to be adjacent: this is illustrated by
the embedded configuration consisting of 2 and 3 in dialogue frag-
ment 1. Such configurations are quite common and known as insertion
sequences (Schegloff, 1972).
Descriptive work on dialogue has uncovered a wealth of information
regarding the structures that are exhibited by coherent dialogue. Let us
now turn to the question how to account for such structures. Levinson
(1983) argues at length that “Conversation is not a structural product
in the same way that a sentence is – it is rather the outcome of the
interaction of two or more independent, goal-directed individuals, with
often divergent interests.” (Levinson, 1983:294) The aim of the current
paper is to offer a model that accounts for certain structural properties
precisely in terms of the interaction between independent, goal-directed
3 Viewing dialogue acts as occupying multiple dimensions has been advocated by
several researchers on dialogue act annotation; see, e.g., Bunt & Girard (2005) and
Petukhova & Bunt (2007).
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agents, with a focus on agents as logical reasoners. The orientation
of the current paper is primarily formal rather than descriptive. In
the words of one of the pioneers of formal models of dialogue, C.L.
Hamblin: “A formal approach, on the other hand, [as opposed to a
descriptive one] consists in the setting up of simple systems of precise
but not necessarily realistic rules, and the plotting of the properties
of the dialogues that might be played out in accordance with them.”
(Hamblin, 1970:256) Thus, the system we propose is described in its
own right, and the extent to which it agrees with reality is illustrated by
investigating similarities and differences between the dialogues that it
produces and the structural properties of naturally occurring dialogues
as described by conversation analysts (see also footnote 2).
The motivating idea behind the current paper is an exercise in philo-
sophical logic: to explore the relation between cooperative dialogue and
logical inference. For this reason, a logical inference system sits at the
core of our formal systems and we try to keep extension of this core to
a minimum; in particular, we refrain from recourse to nested beliefs,
intentions, and any other complex propositional attitudes that have
been invoked for modelling dialogue.4
Since we aim to present formal systems for modelling coherent co-
operative information-oriented dialogue, it is inevitable that we need
to make a number of idealizing assumptions. Before we proceed, let us
declare these assumptions:
− The systems that we will study are based on propositional logic
without negation. Thus, we forego issues concerning natural lan-
guage interpretation and maintenance of consistency.
− The scope of the systems is restricted to successful communicative
acts:
• We assume that there is a perfect communication channel (no
misperception).
• The language is fully shared.
• The language is free of ambiguous expressions.
4 In this respect, we follow Taylor et al (1996) who argue that for reactive co-
operative dialogue (i.e., where no interpretation/plan recognition is involved), as in
our current work, nested beliefs are superfluous. They also show that even if plan
recognition is added, as long as the dialogue is cooperative, nested beliefs beyond
level 2 are unnecessary. However, for modeling intentional deception in dialogue,
nested beliefs beyond level 2 do play a role. See Cohen et al. (1990) for a collection of
papers where nested beliefs and intentions are dealth with. In section 8, we compare
our approach with other work on dialogue modelling.
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− All communication is literal; speakers express what they mean by
saying it, rather than by Gricean implicature (Grice, 1975).
3. Meaning as Inferential Role
The theory of meaning that we employ broadly follows the meaning-
theoretic deliberations of Brandom (1994). The formalization is along
the lines described in Sundholm (1986),5 though there are also im-
portant differences (see section 8). Meaning is characterized in terms
of inferential role, rather than truth-conditions.6 This does, however,
not exclude the possibility of a reconstruction of truth in terms of the
framework described in this paper (cf. Brandom 1994).
We start with a system involving a single agent, henceforth α. This
system captures the practical ability of the agent to reason with ex-
pressions of a language L. This language consists exclusively of atomic
formulae At ⊂ L, and formulae that are constructed from members
of L using the connectives for implication ‘→’ and conjunction ‘&’: if
A,B ∈ L, then (A→ B) ∈ L and (A&B) ∈ L.7
Inferences are formalized in terms of judgements of the form [α]H ⊢
A. These should be read as agent α (henceforth, references to agents
are omitted when it is clear from the context which agent the judge-
ment belongs to) affirms/derives A, given the local assumptions H (i.e.,
assumptions that are only accessible for the duration of an inference).
In addition to the collection of local assumptions (H), an agent, such
as α, also relies on a set of global assumptions (Γα). In our system, Γα
functions like a global variable in a programming language whose value
is accessible at any time during an inference. The value of Γα can be
updated through declarations. For instance, the following declaration
adds the assumption denoted by the proposition letter a to Γα’s current
value: Γα := Γα ∪ {a}. Note that we use capitals (e.g., A and B) as
meta-variables over proposition letters and lower case (e.g., a and b)
for the actual proposition letters.
An assumption A ∈ (H∪Γα) is thought of in terms of the disposition
of α to affirm A. This disposition is made explicit by the following
deduction rule:
(3) (member) A ∈ Γ ∪HH ⊢ A
5 Sundholm bases much of his formalization on proposals by the philoso-
phers/logicians Michael Dummett and Dag Prawitz.
6 Peter Schroeder-Heister introduced the term “Proof-Theoretic Semantics” for
this approach to meaning.
7 Henceforth, brackets will be omitted when there is no danger of ambiguity.
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This rule says that formula A can be inferred/derived/deduced from H
and the implicit global assumptions Γ, if A is a member of the union
of Γ and H. The characterization Γ ∪ H in terms of its inferential
role replaces classical explications in terms of representation/truth-
conditions.
The inferential role of logical vocabulary is given a special place
in the current scheme: a logical connective allows an agent to express
explicitly a pattern of inference that it already follows. For instance,
an agent who is disposed to deriving ‘The tiles get wet’ from ‘it rains’,
can make this practical activity explicit by affirming ‘If it rains, the
tiles get wet’.
The meaning of a logical connective is given by the circumstances of
appropriate application of that connective and the appropriate conse-
quences of such an application. For the conditional ‘→’ the appropriate
circumstances of application are given by the following introduction
rule for conditionals:
(4) (arrow intro)
H ∪ {A} ⊢ B
H ⊢ A→ B
Thus, we can derive the conditional A → B, if we can derive B from
the local assumptions extended with the new assumption A. The ap-
propriate consequences of using ‘→’ are given by the following rule for
eliminating the arrow:
(5) (arrow elim) H ⊢ A→ B H ⊢ AH ⊢ B
This rule is chosen so that the arrow intro and elim rules together intro-
duce only inferences regarding the logical connective ‘→’. In Dummett’s
terms, the rules are in harmony with antecedent inferential practices.
This requirement is essential, because of the explicative role of logical
vocabulary: it should serve to make explicit existing inferential prac-
tices; it should not license novel inferences involving the pre-existing
vocabulary, since that would destroy its explicative role. In the words
of Schroeder-Heister (2006:533): “nothing is gained by an application
of an elimination rule if its major premiss has been derived according
to its meaning (i.e., by means of an introduction rule).”.
The rules for conjunction introduction and elimination are the fol-
lowing:
(6) (conj. intro) H ⊢ A H ⊢ BH ⊢ A&B
(7) (conj. elim) H ⊢ A&BH ⊢ A
H ⊢ A&B
H ⊢ B
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Given these explications of the logical constants ‘→’ and ‘&’, deriva-
tions can be constructed. For example, given a set of global assumptions
Γ = {a → b, b → c}, we can derive the judgement ∅ ⊢ a → c
(henceforth, the goal of the derivation):
(8)
a ∈ Γ ∪ {a}
{a} ⊢ a
(v)
(a→ b) ∈ Γ ∪ {a}
{a} ⊢ a→ b
(vi)
{a} ⊢ b
(iv)
(b→ c) ∈ Γ ∪ {a}
{a} ⊢ b→ c
(iii)
{a} ⊢ c
(ii)
∅ ⊢ a→ c
(i)
The individual inference steps in derivation 8 have been labelled with
roman numerals. The goal of the derivation is located at the root of the
derivation tree. This goal has no local assumptions. Working backwards
(i.e., upwards from the root), the arrow introduction rule can be applied
(i). This leads to a judgement with one local assumption (a): the goal is
to derive c against the background of this local assumption. Moving up
one step further via (ii) – the arrow elimination rule – we arrive at two
goals. The second of these is {a} ⊢ b→ c. This goal can be derived via
the member rule (step iii), and consequently the second branch of the
derivation tree is closed. The member rule applies, because we assumed
at the outset that (b→ c) is a member of the set of global assumptions
Γ. The other branch requires a derivation of the judgement {a} ⊢ b. We
arrive at this judgement via step (iv), which is another application of
the arrow elimination rule. Steps (v) and (vi) both involve the member
rule. Firstly, a ∈ Γ ∪ {a} succeeds because a is member of the local
assumptions, and secondly, (a → b) ∈ Γ ∪ {a} succeeds in virtue of
(a→ b) being a member of the global assumptions Γ.
Generally, in a derivation tree the goal resides at the root of the
tree, and application of the member rule takes places at the leaves of
the tree.
4. System S1: Situated Inferential Practice and Dialogue
The system presented so far is limited to solitary reasoners that are
isolated both from other reasoners and from the world around them.
In this section, we present a first extension which removes the former
limitation. We will refer to the system described in the current section
as S1.
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4.1. The Transfer Rule
We introduce a set of agents A, with α, β, γ, . . . as meta-variables
over members of A (further on we will also use α, β, γ, . . . as names for
specific agents). We now add a rule for transferring proof goals between
agents:
(9)
(tr)
[β] H ⊢ A
[α] H ⊢ A
Γα := Γα ∪ {
∧
H → A}
and 〈α, β〉 ∈ C
This transfer rule (tr) tells us that if agent β can derive A under the
local assumptions H, then agent α can also derive A under the local
assumptions H, provided that the two conditions on the right-hand
side are satisfied.
The first condition says that the context Γα of global assumptions
entertained by α, should be extended with
∧
H → A. Here,
∧
H stands
for the conjunction A1&A2& . . . of the formulae A1, A2, . . . that are
members of H. If H is empty,
∧
H → A = A. This condition ensures
that as a result of a transfer step the information that is transferred,
say N , becomes part of the global assumptions of the recipient of the
information. In other words, as a result of the transfer step, the recipient
of the information can now derive N without invoking the transfer step;
the information has become a part of the global assumptions and can
also be accessed directly via the member rule.
The second condition (〈α, β〉 ∈ C) says that there should be a com-
munication channel between α and β (where C ⊆ A × A). The side
condition in combination with C allows us to model situations in which
not every agent can exchange information with every other agent in
A. However, unless stated otherwise, we will henceforth assume that
C = A × A, i.e., information can be transferred between any pair of
agents.
4.2. Example of a Proof Tree
Take a situation involving the agents α, β and γ in which Γα = ∅,
Γβ = {a}, and Γγ = {b}. Let us assume that α wants to build a
proof for a&b. Since neither a nor b is part of Γα, α will need to access
information held by β and γ. This situation is represented pictorially in
Figure 1 where each dot represents an agent, boxes represent the global
assumptions of the agents and the arrows represent the communication
channels between the agents. The following proof tree illustrates what
a derivation of a&b looks like in this multi-agent setting:
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Figure 1. Multi-agent situation
(10)
[β] a ∈ Γβ ∪ ∅
[β] ∅ ⊢ a
(mem.)
[α] ∅ ⊢ a
(1)(tr)
[γ] b ∈ Γγ ∪ ∅
[γ] ∅ ⊢ b
(mem.)
[α] ∅ ⊢ b
(2)(tr)
[α] ∅ ⊢ a&b
(conj.intro)
Side conditions:
(1) Γα := Γα ∪ {a};
(2) Γα := Γα ∪ {b}.
Note that we omitted the side condition regarding the communica-
tion channel. We conveniently assumed that all agents can exchange
information with all other agents.
Execution of the side conditions (1) and (2) results in Γα = {a, b}.
As a result of the construction of this proof, we have arrived at a Γα in
which a proof for a&b can be constructed directly, without recourse to
the transfer. In other words, a&b has become part of α’s information.
4.3. From Proof Trees to Dialogue Structure
The final steps for going from logic to dialogue consist of a transfor-
mation of the proof tree to a dialogue (structure). Here we describe
an algorithm that has been implemented.8 We proceed in two steps.
Firstly, we map the hierarchical tree to a linear structure. For the tree in
10, we obtain the linear representation 11. Each tree node is represented
by an item in the linear structure (for example, the items 4 and 9 below
each represent a single node; the nodes in question are the terminal
nodes of tree 10), and possibly a second item indicating that the part
of the tree dominated by the node has been closed (e.g., the pairs
〈1, 12〉 and 〈2, 6〉 represent single tree nodes; the former corresponds to
the root node of tree 10).
8 See mcs.open.ac.uk/pp2464/resources
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(11) 1. α : goal-derive(a&b)
2. α : (transfer) goal-derive(a)
3. β : goal-derive(a)
4. β : in-assumptions(a)
5. β : confirmed(a)
6. α : confirmed(a)
7. α : (transfer) goal-derive(b)
8. γ : goal-derive(b)
9. γ : in-assumptions(b)
10 γ : confirmed(b)
11. α : confirmed(b)
12. α : confirmed(a&b)
For brevity’s sake, we have omitted reference to the empty set of local
hypotheses. Strictly speaking, we should, for instance, have written
goal-derive(a&b,given-that,∅) instead of goal-derive(a&b).
The sequence in 11 is not yet a straightforward dialogue. It contains
various locutions which can be thought of as internal monologues of
the interlocutors with themselves. For the mapping from an extensive
dialogue representation, such as 11, to a more compact and readable
dialogue structure we use the following rules (which are applied in their
order of appearance):
(12) 1. αi : goal-derive(A) 7→ αi : I am wondering whether A can be
derived.
2. αi : (transfer) goal-derive(A), αj : I am wondering whether A
can be derived. 7→ αi : Tell me αj , is A derivable?
3. αi : confirmed(A), αj : confirmed(A) 7→ αi : confirmed(A).
4. αi : in-assumptions(A), αi : confirmed(A) 7→ αi : Yes, A.
5. αi : I am wondering whether A can be derived. (αi : X)
∗ αi :
confirmed(A) 7→ ǫ
6. αi : confirmed(A) 7→ αi : That confirms A.
Let us briefly motivate each of these rules. Rule 12.1 serves readability
by paraphrasing a dialogue move in English. Rule 12.2 implements
the assumption that the dialogue is cooperative, by expressing the
transfer of a derivation goal as a request and making the take up
by the addressee implicit. Rule 12.3 removes redundant repetition of
information: if αi performs a confirmation regarding some bit of in-
formation, followed by αj ’s confirmation, then αj ’s agreement does not
need to be made explicit. Rule 12.4 maps the completion of a derivation
branch (‘in-assumptions(A)’) to a ‘yes’-answer. Rule 12.5 makes sure
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that proof searches that involve only a single agent are omitted from the
conversation (these would otherwise show up as internal monologues of
the agent in question). Finally, rule 12.6 again merely serves readability
of the resulting dialogue. For the purpose of this paper these rules fulfil
their function: they allow us to show how a proof tree can be related to
a dialogue. How much of the proof tree is made explicit in the dialogue
depends, however, on factors (e.g., personality characteristics of the
agent) that are beyond the scope of this paper and deserve further
study. When the current mapping rules are applied to 11, we obtain:
(13) 1. α : I am wondering whether a&b can be derived.
2. α : Tell me β, is a derivable?
3. β : Yes, a.
4. α : Tell me γ, is b derivable?
5. γ : Yes, b.
6. α : That confirms a&b.
This dialogue exhibits three of the conversation analytical configura-
tions we discussed in section 2: there are two adjacency pairs (2,3),
(4,5), one non-adjacent pair (1,6), and an insertion sequence consisting
of the pairs (2,3) and (4,5).
5. Generative Systems as Abstract Models of Dialogue
Before we proceed with presenting a number of extensions to system
S1, let us take a step back and make explicit what such systems have
in common. Each generative system S functions as an abstract model
of cooperative information-oriented dialogue, and has the following
components:
1. A hybrid inference system I consisting of:
a) A language L (e.g., the language of propositional logic or a
fragment thereof);
b) A set of agents αi ∈ A, each with a set of assumptions Γαi ;
c) A communication channel C that specifies which agents can
communicate with each other (i.e., C ⊆ A×A );
d) A set of hybrid inference rules R for the language and the
agents. The rules are hybrid because they can encompass nat-
ural deduction, observation and communication. The rules en-
able us to build proof trees (or proof search trees, as we will see
in a moment).
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2. A specification of the set of potential dialogues DP between the
agents, given the language L.
3. A mapping m from proof trees, generated with I, to coherent
dialogues D.
Figure 2. Diagram of a Generative System for Dialogue Generation
In short, a generative system S is a triple 〈I,DP ,m〉. The purpose of
such a system is the characterization of coherent dialogues (members
of D). This is achieved by using I = 〈L,A, C,R〉 to generate proof
trees, that is trees representing valid inferences (or, as we shall see in
a moment, searches for valid inferences). These proof trees are then
mapped by m to members of DP (the set of potential dialogues, which
we will characterize using a grammar in bnf notation).
A member of DP that can be generated from a proof tree usingm is a
member of the set of proper, i.e., coherent, dialogues D (with D ⊂ DP );
see Figure 2. The mapping m turns a proof tree into a linear dialogue
representation (omitting proof steps that do not involve communication
between agents).
We will investigate a series of more and more complex systems for the
generation of abstract coherent dialogues. As we progress through the
series, an increasing number of phenomena that occur in real dialogue
will be covered.
6. System S2: From Proof Trees to Proof Search Trees
System S1 has one major drawback: it only allows for dialogues gener-
ated from complete proof trees. What is lost is the search for a proof
which many cooperative information-oriented dialogues revolve around.
People in conversation will often explore unfruitful paths, and have
to use locutions such as: ‘I cannot derive A’ (or in more colloquial
language: ‘I don’t know’). A first step toward remedying this situation is
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the addition of such locutions to DP . The new set of potential dialogues
DP is given using bnf notation:
(14) 〈DP 〉 :== 〈Loc〉,〈DP 〉 | ǫ
〈Loc〉 :== 〈Agent〉: I am wondering whether
〈Prop〉 can be derived. |
〈Agent〉: Tell me 〈Agent〉, can you
derive 〈Prop〉? |
〈Agent〉: No, I can’t derive 〈Prop〉. |
〈Agent〉: Yes, 〈Prop〉. |
〈Agent〉: That confirms 〈Prop〉.
〈Agent〉 :== α | β | . . .
〈Prop〉 :== a | b | . . . | 〈Prop〉& 〈Prop〉 | 〈Prop〉 → 〈Prop〉
With respect to this set of potential dialogues, our inference system
is incomplete: there are members of DP which are intuitively coherent
dialogues (involving the locution ‘〈Agent〉: No, I can’t derive 〈Prop〉’),
which cannot be generated in S1. To address this problem, we move
from proof trees to proof search trees and then define the mapping m
for proof search trees.
Let us examine an example of a proof search tree. We have omitted
rule labels and conditions to fit the tree on this page.
(15)
(⋆1) [β] ∅ ⊢ a
[γ] a ∈ Γγ ∪ ∅
(⋆2) [γ] ∅ ⊢ a
[α] ∅ ⊢ a
[γ] b ∈ Γγ ∪ ∅
[γ] ∅ ⊢ b
[α] ∅ ⊢ b
[α] ∅ ⊢ a&b
The difference between a proof search tree, such as 15, and a proof tree,
such as 10, is that a proof search tree can contain alternative search
branches. These are indicated by the use of ⋆. The proof search tree 15
has an unsuccessful branch ⋆1 and a successful one, i.e., ⋆2 (henceforth
we assume that successful search branches are always to the right of
unsuccessful ones). This tree would, for example, fit a situation where
we set out with Γα = Γβ = ∅ and Γγ = {a, b}.
As before, we map the tree to a dialogue in two steps. The result of
applying the first mapping is:
(16) 1. α : goal-derive(a&b)
2. α : (transfer) goal-derive(a)
3. β : goal-derive(a)
4. β : not-derived(a)
5. α : not-derived(a)
6. α : (transfer) goal-derive(a)
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7. γ : goal-derive(a)
8. γ : in-assumptions(a)
9. γ : confirmed(a)
10. α : confirmed(a)
11. α : (transfer) goal-derive(b)
12. γ : goal-derive(b)
13. γ : in-assumptions(b)
14. γ : confirmed(b)
15. α : confirmed(b)
16. α : confirmed(a&b)
The second half of the mapping requires the mapping rules of S1 and
two additional rules:
− αi : not-derived(A), αj : not-derived(A) 7→ αi : not-derived(A)
− αi : not-derived(A) 7→ αi : No, I can’t derive A.
Application of the extended set of mapping rules to 16 results in:
(17) 1. α : I am wondering whether a&b can be derived.
2. α : Tell me β, can you derive a?
3. β : No, I can’t derive a.
4. α : Tell me γ, can you derive a?
5. γ : Yes, a.
6. α : Tell me γ, can you derive b?
7. γ : Yes, b.
8. α : That confirms a&b.
7. System S3: Adding Observation
In S1 and S2, we went beyond common inference systems by moving
from the model of a solitary reasoner to a community of reasoners who
exchange information with each other. Communication is, however, not
the only way reasoners acquire new information. In particular, obser-
vation of the environment is a further means of information acquisition
that the traditional model of logical inference does not deal with. In
this respect, S1 and S2 are incomplete.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the intricacies of
interspersing reasoning with observation. Rather, we explore a minimal
extension of S2 with a rule that introduces observation:
(18) (obs.)
A ∈ Oα obs(α,A)
[α]H ⊢ A
Γα := Γα ∪ {A}
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This rule states that if the proposition A is an observable proposition
for agent α (written as A ∈ Oα) and α actually observes that A – i.e.,
obs(α,A) – then α can derive A. The rule has one side condition which
requires that Γα is extended with A; written: Γα := Γα ∪ {A}.
Figure 3. Multi-agent situation with observation
To illustrate how this extended calculus can be applied, we model a
conversation between π and δ. π has the flu and rings δ (information
desk of π’s surgery) to find out whether she needs to see a doctor (sd).
For that purpose, she needs to find out whether she has a temperature
(ht). We have Γpi = ∅ and Γδ = {ht→ sd} (see Figure 3). π’s goal is to
find out whether sd; so π tries to derive sd relative to her assumptions.
Given Γpi, π won’t succeed unless she decides to communicate. The
following is a derivation of sd for π that involves both communication
and observation. It highlights how information possessed by δ and
observations that only π is able to perform are combined to obtain
a proof for sd:
(19)
ht ∈ Opi obs(pi, ht)
[pi] ∅ ⊢ ht
(3) (obs.)
[δ] ∅ ⊢ ht
(2) (tr)
[δ] ht→ sd ∈ Γδ
[δ] ∅ ⊢ ht→ sd
[δ] ∅ ⊢ sd
[pi] ∅ ⊢ sd
(1) (tr)
Side conditions: (1) Γpi := Γpi∪{sd}, (2) Γδ := Γδ∪{ht}, (3) Γpi := Γpi∪{ht}.
As a result of the proof construction, Γpi = {ht, sd} and Γδ = {ht →
sd, ht}. Note that although sd /∈ Γδ, δ can now infer sd without recourse
to observation or communication. From the proof tree, we can extract
the moves paraphrased in dialogue 20 (see the appendix at the end of
this paper for details of the mapping). The dialogue contains a well-
known conversation analytical structure, i.e., the insertion sequence
(the subdialogue consisting of 3 and 4):
(20) 1. π: Do I need to see a doctor?
2. δ: Do you have a temperature?
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3. π: Wait a minute [π checks her
temperature], yes, I do.
4. δ: Then you do need to see a doctor.
At the end of this dialogue, π and δ both possess the information ht
and sd. This comes about as a side effect of the derivation of sd, in
particular, the application twice of the transfer rule.
Note that no explicit reasoning about cooperative behaviour is in-
volved (e.g., a rule saying that if π wants to achieve a goal, then δ
helps π achieve it). Rather, multi-agent inference is modelled as a joint
activity which an agent can engage in. In doing so, the agent becomes
part of an ensemble of agents who reason as a group rather than as
individuals. Thus the decision whether to be cooperative is shifted from
individual dialogue moves to joint activities. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to model that decision-making process; here, we simply
assume that the agents are positively disposed to cooperative activities.
8. Related Work
In this section we contrast the approach described in this paper with
other approaches. Firstly, we would like to identify a number of ways
in which the extended Natural Deduction calculus diverges from the
standard calculus that is employed by, for instance, Sundholm (for
specifying inferential roles). In particular, we introduced a distinction
between local and global assumptions and used the member rule to
access both types of assumptions. Global assumptions were introduced
to collect premises from sources other than inference (i.e., communi-
cation and observation). Another crucial extension was the explicit
relativization of judgements and assumptions to agents.
Secondly, the proof-theoretic transfer rule for information exchange
between agents should not be confused with rules for transferring in-
formation between modalities in Modal Logic (ml). In ml, one can
paraphrase the transfer rule with the axiom scheme ⊢ 2αA → 2βA
which allows information to be transferred between the modalities 2α
and 2β (for arbitrary α and β). However, according to the model-
theoretic interpretation of ml, such an axiom destroys the distinction
between 2α and 2β : the axiom scheme is true if for a model M and
world w: 〈M,w〉 |= 2αA then 〈M,w〉 |= 2βA and vice versa. If mean-
ing is conceived of in strictly model-theoretical terms, inference steps
play no role, and consequently no distinction is made between explicit
information that is directly available to an agent (information that is
part of the global assumptions of the agent), and implicit information
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that is only accessible through inference, communication and/or obser-
vation. In the systems proposed in this paper, if agents α and β can
transfer information between each other, they implicitly have access
to exactly the same information. They differ, however, with regards
to the ease with which this information can be accessed: if some piece
of information is part of α’s global assumptions, but not β’s, then α
has direct access, whereas access by β requires transfer of information
with α. In terms of proof trees/derivations, α’s proof tree for the same
information requires less steps than β’s proof tree.
Thirdly, our approach differs in a number of respects from extant
models of dialogue. Here we compare our approach with two repre-
sentative classes of alternatives. Firstly, there is a body of work based
on the idea that dialogues can be characterized in terms of update
and generation rules for information states. For example, (Beun, 2001)
introduces special purpose generation rules to achieve the same effect
as our intro and elim rules for ‘→’, Power (1979) makes use of con-
versational procedures, Ginzburg (1996) proposes up- and downdating
rules for the partially ordered questions under discussion, and Traum
& Larsson (2003) describe a generic framework for information state-
based dialogue. A comparison of some of these approaches is provided
by Pulman (1999). Our approach distinguishes itself from these pro-
posals by explaining dialogue coherence in terms of the independently
motivated inferential roles of the logical constants. Secondly, there is
a dialogue game approach going back to the work of Lorenzen – see
Lorenzen & Lorenz (1978) – where the logical constants are defined in
terms of their role in rational debates. There the order of explanation
is from (a) formal winning strategies for adversarial dialogues (debate)
to (b) valid patterns of reasoning involving the logical constants.9 In
contrast, we proceed from (b) valid patterns of reasoning involving the
logical constants to (c) coherent cooperative dialogue. The undertak-
ings are complementary and raise the rather surprising prospect of an
account of cooperative dialogue based on adversarial dialogue (debate);
that is, an account from (a) to (c) via (b).
9 The relations between this dialogue method and other formal logics (axiomatic,
natural deduction, etc.) is examined in detail in Barth & Krabbe (1982). Hamblin
(1971) also explores derivations in this direction: from a specification of legal dia-
logue – though his dialogues are information-oriented, rather than adversarial – to
semantic properties of locutions. Furthermore, the game-theoretical semantics that
has been developed by Hintikka and collaborators (Saarinen, 1979) has some central
features in common Lorenzen’s dialogue games.
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9. Limitations and Further Research
The aim of this paper is to provide the foundations for a generative
logic-based model of dialogue coherence. The generic framework is de-
scribed in section 5, whereas specific systems are developed in sections
4, 6 and 7. The purpose of these systems was to demonstrate that
the type of analysis advocated here can account for certain dialogue
structures. We discussed a number of idealizing assumptions underly-
ing the current systems in section 2. In this section, we provide some
suggestions on how to address these in further research.
The current systems only deal with information-oriented dialogues.
In future, we would like to investigate application of the current frame-
work to action-oriented dialogues that involve imperatives and actions.
This will require the introduction of new types of judgements alongside
the current one of a proposition A being derivable by agent α. In
particular, for action-oriented dialogue a notion of A being realizable
by agent α is needed.
Even within the scope of information-oriented dialogues, the current
work is limited to the language of proposition logic without negation.
This is a serious limitation, since it restricts our treatment of polar
questions. Currently, we only deal with questions of the form Can A be
derived?, whose answers correspond to the outcome of a proof search
for A. We do not deal with the more straightforward question A?,
since this requires negation to model the possible answer ¬A. Our first
priority for further work is to develop further systems that incorporate
more expressive logics with negation, up to the full predicate calculus.
For this purpose, we will build on an implementation of a system for
natural deduction for predicate and higher order logics (Piwek, 2006),
and the work on consistency maintenance in type theory-based natural
deduction systems by Borghuis and Nederpelt (2000). A type-theoretic
framework will also allow us to address certain aspects of the process
of language interpretation. In particular, it allows us to cast presuppo-
sition and anaphora resolution in proof-theoretic terms as shown by,
among others, (Piwek and Krahmer, 2000).
Non-standard inferences, which are needed to deal with implicatures
(Grice, 1975) can be accommodated by the systems proposed here. For
that purpose, we need to model such patterns of inference in terms
of abduction. Abduction does not require novel deduction rules, but
rather involves introducing a new type of proof goal, i.e., the goal to
find a set of assumptions ∆ such that with respect to Γ ∪ ∆ some
proposition can be derived. There is an extensive literature on the
constraints that members of ∆ should satisfy, such as minimality (Cox
and Pietrzykowski, 1986) and corroboration (Evans and Kakas, 1992).
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Moreover, default reasoning can be dealt with in terms of abduction
(see, e.g., Kakas et al. 1998).
Currently, our model of dialogue coherence only distinguishes be-
tween coherent and incoherent dialogue. Within the group of coherent
dialogues, one might, however, also wish to distinguish between dif-
ferent degrees of coherence. For example, Beun (2001) points out that
his system needs to be extended with rules to prevent generation of
dialogues with loops (e.g., by not allowing an agent to ask the same
question twice). We propose to introduce an ordering from more to less
coherent, rather than to mark such dialogue as incoherent. Soft global
constraints/preferences (assigning satisfaction levels to proof search
trees, e.g., based on the number of repetitions of particular derivation
steps) promise to be a suitable means for ordering proof trees with
respect to each other, and indirectly the dialogues that are generated
from them.
Finally, our framework is set up so that proof (search) trees are
produced first and then mapped to dialogue (structures). This provides
us with a theoretically clean and transparent framework for relating
inference systems to dialogue structure. The work also has practical
potential, for example, as a framework for generating information pre-
sentations in dialogue form; see the discussion of dialogue as discourse
in Piwek & Van Deemter (2002). Nevertheless, there is also scope for in-
vestigating how the mapping rules can be integrated with proof search,
thus making it possible to use the resulting system in human-computer
dialogue.
10. Conclusion
The current paper is foundational in nature. We show how to model
dialogue coherence in terms of generative systems that rely on an
extended calculus of Natural Deduction. At the core of this account
is the standard Natural Deduction calculus which has been motivated
independently. The paper presents extensions of the calculus with rules
for communication and observation, and describes a mapping from
proof (search) trees to dialogue structures that exhibit some of the
properties that are also found in naturally occurring dialogues.
We hope that this paper will stimulate further research into the
relation between logic/sentence semantics and dialogue coherence, and
provide a starting pointing for understanding logical reasoning as an
activity that is inseparable from other information processing activities
such as observation and communication – something which is often
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neglected when logical reasoning is taught as a disembodied, solitary
activity.10
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Appendix
(21) Extensive Dialogue (for proof tree 19)
1. π : goal-derive(sd)
2. π : (transfer) goal-derive(sd)
3. δ : goal-derive(sd)
4. δ : goal-derive(ht)
5. δ : (transfer) goal-derive(ht)
6. π : goal-derive(ht)
7. π : observe(ht)
8. π : confirmed(ht)
9. δ : confirmed(ht)
10 δ : goal(ht→ sd)
11. δ : in-assumptions(ht→ sd)
12. δ : confirmed(ht→ sd)
13. δ : confirmed(sd)
14. π : confirmed(sd)
For the mapping from this extensive to a compact dialogue we need
one new locution (‘Yes, I observed that A’) and an additional mapping
rule:
αi : observe(A), αi : confirmed(A) 7→ αi : Yes, I observed that A.
Application of the mapping rules to the extensive dialogue 21 results
in the following compact dialogue:
(22) Compact Dialogue
10 A commendable exception is Barwise & Etchemendy (1994) which does deal
with the role of observation, though not communication, in logical reasoning.
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1. π : I am wondering whether sd can be
2. derived. Tell me δ, is sd derivable?
3. δ : Tell me π, is ht derivable?
4. π : Yes, I observed ht.
5. δ : That confirms sd.
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